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In July and August 1895 the governor of Natal and Zululand, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, 
went with his wife on a tour of the colony of Zululand. As on the occasion of a former 
tour in 1893, and as was the practice of successive Zululand Resident Commissioners and 
Governors since 1889, his official report included the observation: "The natives appear 
contented and quiet . . . [they] appeax to be in good case and satisfied with their 
lot." (1) Throu&out the 1890s phrases of this nature were intertwined with reports on 
the ravages of locusts, famine, smallpox, and in 1897 rinderpest. But for British civil 
servants there was no paradox in these reports. As I intend to show, a system of 
government was laid down in the early years of British administration in Zululand and the 
natural disasters in the later years resulted in the extension of this system. The 
disasters increased the power of the colonial governors over their subjects. According 
to the outlook of the imperial administrators, men dependent on them were "contented 
and quiet". 
But Britain could not foresee when she first exercised a form of direct rule 
over southern Zululd (then called the Zulu Native ~eserve) in 1883, and when she 
annexed the whole of Zululand in 1887, that she would be able to use epidemics and 
famine to maintain herself in power. In the 1880s British power in Zululand was 
limited. This was because it was a period of war and upheaval, and British power was 
exercised mainly by its troops. But once Dinuzulu had been defeated, tried and exiled 
in 1889, British objectives in Zululand became more diverse and the government of the 
colony was structured accordingly. The natural disasters of the 1890s reinforced this 
structure. 
The Nqutu district of Zululand is the south-western area which 
borders on Natal. It was incorporated into the Zulu Native Reserve in 1883, aYld a 
study of its history provides a microcosm of British rule in Zululand until 1897. 
It is generally considered that Britain left southern Zululand as a reserve 
outside the power of Ck%m to conciliate the vested interests of John Dunn and Hlubi, 
two of the thirteen appointed chieftains who may not have wished to be ruled by 
f2ekkt- when he returned to power in 1883. (2) Guy paints a more complicated picture, 
showing the divergent points of view of Kimberley in the Colonial Office in London, who 
wanted to take f r o m C ~ o z m d  place under British rule a small area for the chiefs 
who were not prepared to accept Ce-0's authority, and Bulwer, the special 
commissioner for Zululand aJnd governor of Natal, who wanted to reserve a much larger 
area and have territory, if not annexed to Natal, at least made a British protectorate. 
In Bulwerls view, Natal might then feel that her border was secure and an area created 
in which Zulu in Natal could settle rather thaa live on the Crown lands of Natal, 
obstructing the development of these lands by white farmers. (3) Kimberley's view 
prevailed but Bulwer was able to secure the kind of government he desired in the 
Reserve. This puzzles Guy. (4) Guy is also surprised by the fact that Bulwer's 
Natal advisers, who ! l . . .  with all their prejudices, were men of immense experience", 
could be party to an unworkable policy in Zululand that required men attached to their 
land to leave it if they wished to live under a different political authority. (5) 
l 
l I believe that in all these interpretations Britain's gloss on her motives 
for the creation of the Reserve has not been sufficiently examined. If Britain wished 
only to set aside land for those people who did not desire to be ruled by Cetshwayo, why 
l did she not create one large reserve in the north under Sibebu, or two small reserves 
I 
virtually anywhere in Zululand? The sane reasons that had prompted Wolseley to give , 
Hlubi and John bnn, Britain's creatures, the two southern chiefdoms in 1879 (6) I 
motivated Kimberley and Bulwer in 1883. It was necessary to secure the border with 1 
Natal and for Britain to have a military foothold in Zululand. There was never any l 
disagreement between Bulwer and Kimberley on the need for the establishment of a 
Reserve in the south, only on its size. (7) 
Nor was there any disagreement between them on the prime function of the 
Reserve. Kimberley wrote to Bulwer: I1On the administration of the reserved 
territory - Her Majesty's Government entirely agree in your proposals that 'the 
necessary means for the maintenance of good order and for the defence of the protected 
territory shall be furnished by the several chiefs and headmen living in the protected 
territory in such manner as may be provided by concert and agreement between the 
Resident Commissioner and the several chiefs and headmen', and that 'the Resident 
Commissioner shall have the power to call out all native male adults living in the 
protected territory for military service in defence of the protected territory or for 
the maintenance of public order! . l' (8) The major disagreement between Whitehall and 
Pietermaritzburg concerned the form the British military presence should take. 
Kimberley's despatch to Bulwer continued: "It would give rise to misapprehension and 
weaken the sense of the responsibility of the inhabitants [of the ~eserve] for their 
own protection to use the term 'protected territory!, which would imply that the 
inhabitants are to depend for defence not on themselves but on the British power. 'l ( 9 )  
Bulwer acceded to this and proposed that a small Eumpean force of 25 mounted policemen 
under an officer be attached to the Resident Commissioner' S headquarters. (10) 
The extent to which the Reserve was to be mainly a British military foothold 
can be gauged by the sketchy provisions made for its administration. Kimberley, in 
defending this, sheltered behind his posture of magnanimity with regard to Cetshwayo. 
He wmte to Bulwer: "So much must depend on the numbers and character of the chiefs 
and people who may elect to remain under Cetwayols rule, that it seems to Her Majesty's 
Government it would be premature at once to settle the details of the acbinistration of 
this reserve." (11) As if he were aware how weak this must sound, he continued: "The 
most urgent question of detail appears to be the bodyguard of European police." (12) 
Given this outlook in Whitehall, Guy's surprise at Bulwer securing his t m e  of 
government in the Reserve is unwarranted. 
What is significant about the outlines for the administration of the Reserve 
that were spelled out by Bulwer in 1883 a;nd endorsed by the Colonial Office is their 
conciliatory attitude to the chiefs and the people. John Shepstone was informed that 
it was his qllong experience as a public officer in official relations with the native 
populations ... thoroupjh knowledge of the people, and ... tact and judgement" which 
had secured him the job of resident commissioner. (13) With regard to Hlubi, John Dunn 
and other appointed chiefs, he was informed that: "It will be your care to consider 
how far [their] interests can be met, and it will be for you to assigm them locations 
that will be fully sufficient to their wants and for those of their followers." (14) 
Britain did not disguise the fact that she would rule, but she was ensuing the velvet 
on the glove was soft. 
As with land allocation, so with taxation, There was no question but that it 
would be imposed, although Shepstone was informed that "Ber Majesty's government have 
authorised it to be 14/-, if there is no reason to apprehend any resistance to it. 
You will be the best judge of this point and also whether under the circumstances of 
the territory it will be advisable to fix the hut tax at that rate or at a lesser 
rate. l1 (15) On tax collection Shepstone was instructed l!.. . where there is an 
ascertained inability on the part of anyone to pay ... the case should be dealt with 
in a liberal spirit by the Resident Commissioner, either by the remission of the tax 
or of a part of it, or by giving ample time for papentll. (16) Britain' S lenient 
attitude to the government of the Reserve in maintaining the authority of existing 
I chiefs, securing them land, not strictly enforcing taxation, contributes to the view 
that the Reserve was created to fulfil one of Britain's strategic aims: it was to be 
a loyal military buffer between the unpredictable Usutu under Cetshwayo and the strident 
" Natal settlers. Bulwerls Natal advisers were party to an unworkable solution, as the 
I civil war that followed the 1883 settlement illustrated, but their conviction of the 
I necessity that the border regions be purged of men who did not recognize British ' 
supremacy overrode their llimmense xperience l1 . 
In the period 1883-1887 Britain's outlook on the Ngutu district was a 
I strategic and military one. With this foothold in Zululand she could exercise her 
paramount power over the rest of the country. To maintain herself in power in Nqutu 
l 
and fulfil her strategic aims, it was necessary only to raise enough tax to pay the 
81,000 a year which financed the establishment of the Resident Commissioner (17) and l 
ensure there was no alteration in her relation with Hlubi and his Basotho. It was 
I necessary that these men be called out at short notice and be prepared to serve 
against the Zulu in any engagement. In 1882 it seemed that the change of status that 
was required of Hlubi might shatter his old loyalty to Britain. He did not come to 
I the meeting Shepstone called at Inhlazatshe to inform chiefs and headmen of the new 
territorial arrangements in Zululand. He met Shepstone a week later, and at first I 
l objected when informed he would retain jurisdiction over his immediate following only. 
Finally thou&, according to Yamela, the Resident Commissioner~s induna, he said: 
"What can I say, I must accept the orders of the government.ll (18) At this stage 
Hlubi was almost entirely dependent on the British government for whatever land he used 
in Zululand. His chiefdom comprised one of the areas of strong support for the Zulu 
crown. Both Mehlokazulu and the Qulusi drew large numbers of followers for the 
a Usutu cause from the Nqutu district. Hlubi, with his hundred Basotho families (19), 
l relied just as much on the British crown as it did upon Hlubi's mounted men, and it 
was this relationship that was exploited in 1883. 
But Hlubi was also mollified. Unlike John Dunn, who had his land divided 
into locations and his authority severely circumscribed, Hlubi was allowed to continue 
as though little had changed since 1879 save the coming of white administrators. He 
I seems to have retained the power of land allocation 20 and some judicial powers, 
appointing his own headmen over the people of Nqutu [21{. Britain made no attempt to 
interfere with this exercise of authority for twelve years. 
Hlubi repaid her amply. His men served in the engagements of 1884 and 1888. 
l 
They were used to ltmaintain orderf1 against the Usutu, and fought together with the 
l imperial troops. Nqutu was much used as a military base in these years. Troops were ! moved into the area in October 1883 because of disturbances (22), and again in 
l September 1884. (23) A detachment of imperial troops remained at Rorke's Drift until 
l 
l February 1886. Then the military authorities suggested they should be withdrawn (24), 
l but Osborn, the Resident Commissioner, and Havelock, the governor of Natal and Special 
Commissioner for Zululand, considered that in view of the threatening presence of the i Boers in zululand the force should be maintained. (25) March 1886 it was, in fact, 
increased. (26) It was only in 1892 that any reduction of imperial troops in Zululand 
was considered. (27) 
In 1887 Britain annexed Zululand. This was rather a startling volte-face 
as her policy in the area had, since its conquest, been to maintain her supremacy 
informally. Wolseley had remarked on his settlement in 1879 that it was based on 
expediency, because l!... any statesman unbiased by the colonial avarice for more land 
must feel how important it is to refrain from adding to the already serious and heavy 
responsibilities of empire in South Africa". (28) Kimberley had rebuked Bulwer, who 
desired an annexation of Zululand in 1883: "It would have been most unwise to add the 
whole of Zululand to the long list of native territories brought during recent years 
under British rule, the government of some of which has become a source of serious 
weakness and embarrassment." (29) But in 1886 British supremacy in Zululand was 
challenged by the Boers of the New Republic, who, having assisted Dinuzulu in his 
defeat of Sibebu, claimed virtually the whole country in recognition of their services. 
Bulwer, who had returned to Britain in 1886 and was advising the Colonial Office 
personally, found much sympathy in Whitehall for his advocacy of annexation. The 
Colonial Office became very concerned with the interests of missionaries and traders, 
I the right of Britain to exercise her paramountcy in Zululand, and Natal's loss of Zulu 1 
labour to the Boers. (30) Prominence was given to petitions by the Natal legislature, 
the Durban Chamber of Commerce, and a group of Natal colonists who urged the opening 
of a road through Zululand to the Transvaal gold-fields. (31) Britain's annexation of 
Zululand was based primarily on the need to curtail Boer expansion and prevent the Zulus 
i alienating their land, and pledging their labour and taxes to the agricultural economy 1 l 
l of the South African Republic. A secondary motive was the need to end the strife l 
l 
I between Dinwulu and Sibebu. Although this could probably just as well have been done , 
from the old military base in the Reserve, an annexation in the name of l!,. the Zulu 
people at large beyond the Reserved Territory, whose interests have been destroyed by 
I the leaders of a section of the people and whose welfare cannot be otherwise than the 
i object of solicitude to us" (32), was well in accord with imperialist rhetoric. 
l 
The annexation of Zululand meant that Britain's interests in Nqutu were no , 
l longer purely military, althow the area remained a key to the defence of the colony 
until 1889 and military concerns were uppermost in its government. Until 1889 the 
l 
l 
magistrate for the area was Major A. C. McKean, who served with the 6th Inniskilling 
I dragoons stationed at Rorkels Drift. When he offered his resignation the Colonial 
Office went to considerable pains to secure the consent of the War Office to appoint 
l 
another military man, Captain Pennefather, to the post. (33) There was a protracted 
correspondence on the point, and in the meantime Dinuzulu was defeated, captured and 
put on trial. The next magistrate of Nqutu was a civilian, but with a reputation for 
cruelty and notorious throughout Zululand as an opponent of the Usutu. (34) His 
appointment indicated the need that order be maintained in the district through fear. 
The military importance. of the area was underlined by the continuing good relations 
with Hlubi and his men. The Sotho men were singled out for reward after the battle-of 
Hlopekulu in 1888, with 300 head of captured cattle (35), and in 1889 a disputed claim 
by six Basotho for p w  owing to them from service in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1881 
was settled in favour of the Basotho, because, according to Havelock: "These Basutos 
in common with many others of their tribe have done loyal service and may in future be 
l of use." (36) But the logic of annexation meant it was necessary to rule more firmly 
then the old loose arrangement with Hlubi and the presence of the troops had allowed. (37) 
In the years before the natural disastersBritish political power in Nqutu was 
focussed on the magistrate and wielded through the courts, and through the influence 
over the chiefs assured to the magistrate by his power of land allocation and control 
of the movement of people. The Resident Magistrate had jurisdiction in all civil cases 
involving blacks and whites, and blacks of different tribes, and in most criminal cases. 
The chiefs had jurisdiction according to native law in all civil cases involving men 
of their tribe only, a;nd in criminal cases involving men of their tribe except cases of 
rape, murder, culpable homicide, witchcraft, assaults arising out of faction fights, 
and thefts from other tribes. (38) An analysis of the statistics in regard to crime in 
Zululand illustrates that the vast majority of crimes reported and persons convicted 
involved offences against persons, and offences classed as "other1', that is neither 
offences against persons, property, the Masters and Servants Act or cattle stealing. I 
conclude these "otherf1 offences were against official edicts on movement, gazing 
rights, possession of arms and ammunition or liquor. (39) The vast majority of crimes 
against persons fell under the jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrate. His power was 
further reinforced by the creation of a whole new set of "other" offences which only 
Resident Ma,gistrates could try. 
The right of allotting land was vested in Britain's Zululand government. 
Sale or transfer of land by blacks was considered contrary to "native lawff. (40) An 
anomalous situation developed in Nqutu. Hlubi preserved the powers of land allocation 
he had informally exercised since 1883. The only powers taken by the government were 
in terms of the mining rules and regulations of 1889, which enabled them to license 
prospectors on the Nondweni goldfields. (41) In 1894, however, Sir Marshall Clarke, 
the Resident Commissioner, visited Nqutu and, together with Addison, allocated wards 
within the district, confining Klubi and his people to a much smaller area than they 
had previously occupied and increasing the land of certain Natal chiefs who had 
settled in the area. The old alliance between Britain and the Basotho in Zululand was 
at an end. The removal of the threat of war in Z u l u l a n d  after the defeat of Dinmulu 
had reduced Hlubils usefulness. At the same time the Basotho had become less dependent 
on Britain for their position in Zululand. The men had begun to make a living from 
transport riding and trade. (42) Klubi had amassed considerable sums of money and was 
involved in setting up trading stores on a fairly large scale. (43) Within Nqutu the 
Sotho people possessed large herds and were singled out for attack on that score by 
white settlers who coveted the land. (44) Men who so prospered. as peasants had little 
need to sell their labour in Natal or on the gold-fields of the Transvaal, or even 
within Zululand. That this was one of Britainfs ends in pressing for the demarcation 
of wards in Nqutu is shown in an exchange at the end of Hlubils interview with the 
governor, to whom he had appealed against the decision of the Resident Commissioner. 
Hlubi pointed out that his men who had had their land awarded to other chiefs would 
not be able to live and would have to leave the country. The governor replied that he 
would be ready to give passes to any Basotho who were in such a position. (45) 
But at the same time Hlubils land was being circumscribed his judicial 
powers were increased. In the Nqutu district Hlubi, Mehlokazulu as the hereditary 
chief of the Ngobese tribe, and Mpiyakhe as the hereditary chief of the Mdlalose tribe 
were given special judicial functions to try certain cases referred to them by the 
Resident Magistrates in terms of a proclamation of June 1894. (46) This was the result 
of a recommendation by Sir Marshall Clarke that the Zulu people be encouraged to look 
to certain chiefs first and thro w  them to the Resident Magistrate. (47) In 
increasing the judicial power of certain chiefs, the Zululaid government was seeking, 
through a mixed system of direct and indirect rule, to exert greater authority over 
the people. 
The Resident Magistrate had considerable power because it was he who issued 
the passes that allowed people to move from one district to another, and from Zululand- 
into the South African Republic and Natal. All strangers arriving in the district had 
to be reported to him. (48) As movement out of Nqutu was essential to sell labour and 
produce, this function of the Resident Magistrate touched many thousands of lives. 
l 
1 Britain maintained herself politically in the Nqutu district through the 
powers vested in the Resident Magistrate, and certain measured powers assigned to 
selected chiefs. All white British civil servants were armed. (49) But the combined 
force of the magistracy and the chiefs was not enough in itself to secure the 
reproduction of imperial relations. British power in Zululand rested deteminately 
on the economics of conquest. 
The pivotal point of Britain's administration in Zululand was the levying of 
a hut tax. In contrast to the lenient attitude to the Reserve, the 14/- per annum tax 
I levied in 1887 was designed to be paid on every hut erected by a family, on every wife 
I of a man, whether a separate hut was erected for her or not, and on every hut occupied 
by an unmaxried man. Tax was to be paid in coin and few exceptions to this were to be 
countenanced. (50) Tax collection was taken more seriously and more accurate ! 
1 enumerations of huts were made. (51) 
The levying of the tax was closely related to the need to secure labour for 
Natal and the Transvaal gold-fields. As Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson wrote: "People 
are poor ... if it were not for the high wages they are able to earn at Johannesburg 
and elsewhere, they would have great difficulty in paying the hut tax." (52) Sir 
Marshall Clarke observed in his report on Zululand for 1894 that each year large 
numbers of people left Zululand to seek work in neighbouring states to acquire the 
means of paying their taxes. (53) These two references come in a year of some 
agricultural hardship because of a swmner drought and the first swarms of locusts. (54) 
But, from the time of annexation, observations were made on the amount of money h 
peoplevs haads from labour outside Zululand and their consequent ability to pay tax. (55) 
It was not only taxation that sent men to work on the railways and mines. 
All litigation involved the payment of fees of court in coin (56), and all fines, 
which were the commonest form of punishment for the large category of "other crimesl1 
under which most people were prosecuted, had to be paid in money. (57) Noreover, it 
seems that the Nqutu district was unable to produce enough grain for its population. (58) 
While it is difficult to estimate how much of this shortfall was made up by exchange 
within Zululand, and within the =bit of its precapitalist economy, there was enough 
trade with whites in Nqutu to support 14 traders in the district in 1889, 26 in 1892 
and 73 in 1895 (59), and their presence suggests a dependence on the larger South 
African econoqy for food and commodities in Nqutu which forced the people to sell 
labour in order to subsist. Conquest by Britain had probably led to a large increase 
of the population of the area, with an influx of considerable numbers of Sotho people 
and Natal Zulu (60) and a fundamental dislocation of the old redistributive economy, 
thus necessitating labour migration to earn the wages for food, fines and tax. 
It was not only the Natal railways and the South African Republic goldnines 
that profited from the need of the inhabitants of Zululand to sell their labour. The 
Zululand government was itself a large employer of labour within Zululand. In the 
early years of the administration it embarked on a large programme of public works, 
spending in each successive year greater amounts on the construction of roads'and 
buildings. (61) The rate of wages within Zululand on government buildings was 15/- a 
month with rations. (62) This did not compare with the higher wages of 30/- to 40/- a 
month that could be obtained on the Natal railways (63) or the rumoured £4 a month 
that could be earned on the South African Republic goldmines. (64) But, however hi& 
the wages were outside the country, it was estimated that a migratory worker brought 
back only £6 from a yearts work (65), and it seems that work within Zululand was 
preferred, where possible. (66) The government 1 S public works programme, the 
substantial support given to the goldmining industry in the Nqutu district (67), and 
the enthusiasm which greeted the other mineral discoveries in Zululand (68) sugest 
that the government hoped, where possible, to keep some labour in Zululand under nore 
immediate control, although it was clearly aware of, aad sympathetic to, the needs of 
the rest of the country. (69) 
Political conquest forced the Zulu to participate in the colonial economy 
in two ways, first by selling their labour, which enabled them to p a ~  the taxes and 
fines levied on them and to feed themselves following the disruption of the older 
agricultural system, and, secondly, by putting pressure on them to use money. These 
two consequences of political subjugation are linked. It was the relative ease with 
which Zulu men could move freely to sell their labour that contributed toward 
capitalist development elsewhere in South Africa, and it was the need these men had 
for money, the capitalist medium of exchange and wealth accumulation, that forced them 
on to the labour market. It was largely for strategic reasons that Britain annexed 
Zululand, but,once the country was under direct rule, political power was exercised 
not only to maintain the colonial administration but also to supply the needs of 
capital.. 
But British power, altho* not without impact, was far from extensive, and 
hardly hegemonic. The very small civil establishment at Nqutu (70) could not hope to 
make an adequate estimate of the number of huts and people in the district, and the 
enthusiasm with which each year the Resident Commissioner remarked on the increasing 
ease with which the hut tax was collected casts some doubt on the effectiveness of the l 
l tax collection in the preceding year. (71) Although the revenue from fines and fees of court was large, and rose steadily each year (72), the number of crimes reported in 
Zululand each year, which mag be taken as an indication of the number of people having 
to pay fines or fees of court, while admittedly omitting civil litigation, still 
relates to only a fraction of the population. (73) People moved around the country 
without passes. (74) While many people did have to sell their labour, there were 
still lmge herds in the Nqutu district in the period up to 1896 (75), and even if the 
district was not able to feed itself the amount of grain produced indicates there was 
a sizeable portion of the population for whom agricultural production remained a 
viable way of life. (76) If the pressures to sell labour and earn money were strong, 
they were not overwhelming. The powers of the Resident Magistrate aYld chiefs, 
although considerable on paper, in practice seem to have been more circumscribed. In 
Nqutu the people considered it was their right to settle on land without reference to 
chiefs or magistrate.(fl Although the apparatus of imperial power was well constructed, 
the population of Zululmd, and especially that of Nqutu, was not in quite the state.of 
social disintegration that would have made a good foundation for that power. 
But a number of natural disasters were to increase the need for cash, 
decrease the productivity of the land, swell the numbers of men seeking wage labour, 
and widen the powers of government. The first disaster was a direct consequence of 
labour migration. Men returning from the Witwatersrand broug$t smallpox, which in 1894 
caused a reported 41 deaths in Nqutu; 1,149 people were ill. (78) In the same year 
I large swaxms of locusts caused damage to crops throughout Zululand, (79) They were to 
return the following year. (80) The grain crop in 1894 was a comparative failure, and 
grain had to be hported from Basutoland, Natal and the South African Republic. (81) 1 In 1895 drought and locusts destroyed the crops. Throughout 1896 there was widespread 
famine in Zululand. (82) Although the Nqutu district was not one of the worst affected 1 there was still considerable shortage in the area. (83) In August 1897 rindexpest made 
l its first appearance in Zululand, in the Nqutu Cstrict. (84) By the end of 1897 the 
rough estimates of cattle deaths made by the government officers calculated there had i been 4,342 cattle deaths in Nqutu out of a total of 9,539 for the whole of Zululand (85), althoug$ it was acknowledged that this probably represented only a small fraction of the 
' real number of deaths. (86) 
To all these disasters the Government response was standard. It embarked on 
a programme of state relief, to receive which cash payments had to be made. More 
I 
government officers were appointed and the powers of chiefs were increased. It was not 
l only the disasters themselves that forced men into the cash econoqy to survive in the 
I long term because their basis of subsistence had been eroded; it was the relief offered 
that made the need for money more pressing to survive in the short tern. 
l When smallpox first broke out on a laxge scale in 1894 people were called up 
1 for vaccination and required to pay 6d a head to the vaccinating officer. (87) But it soon became apparent that this charge was more of a deterrent, and that because of it 
l people were reluctant to be vaccinated. In October 1894 Sir Marshal1 Clarke waived the 
charge (88), but government officers continued to be paid out of the Zululand revenue. 
Chiefs were put in charge of appointing "native guardst1 to isolate kraals under 1 quasantine. (89) 
The swarms of locusts that descended on Zululand at the end of 1894 were 
left largely unremarked except in so far as they caused a shortage of grain, which had 
to be imported. But in 1895 the locust swarms attacked Natal crops as well, and it 
was in response to representations made by the Natal government in September 1895 that 
measures were taken to attempt to destroy the locust swarms which hatched in 
Zululand. (90) Government agents were employed to explain to the inhabitants of 
Zululand the ham caused by locusts. Chiefs were empowered to call out the men living 
under them to smoke out locust swarms and. collect the insects into sacks. The chief 
of every tribe was paid 3d for every muid of locusts collected, and given cattle to 
kill for his men as a swarm was destroyed. (91) This response was typical. Authority 
of the chiefs receiving government orders was enhanced, and integration into the cash 
economy carried a step *her. 
I The same pattern may be seen in the government solution to the famine that 1 followed the locust attacks on the young crops and the drought at the end of 1895. 
Sir Marshall Clarke bought 1,090 muids of quick-gmwing mealies at the end of 1895 
which were to be given "on payment to families immediately requiring relief". (92) By 
the end of 1896 £16,876 had been spent by the government on mealies and the 
transportation of them from Natal into Zululand. (93) Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson 
endorsed the measures taken by his Resident Commissioner, remarking: "It is better 
to err on the side of unnecessary expendituxe than to run the risk of exposing the 
people to starvation.ll (94) While one may not doubt the philanthropy behind these efforts 
for famine relief, it is important to note that once again the power of government 
agents was increased. Government stocks of mealies were distributed through the 
resident magistrates. (95) Again pressures were placed on people to participate more 
fully in the cash economy. While payment in cattle was accepted for government mealies, 
the majority of people made payments in cash. In 1896 the government sold mealies 
worth £13,838. Cattle to the value of $3,120 were received in lieu of cash, but most 
payments were in coin, representing a total taking of £9,197. (96) Philanthropy took 
on a different tone when the question of an increase in the number of men leaving 
Zululand to work in Johannesburg and elsewhere was raised. Hely-Hutchinson remarked 
that it would "... not be wise to give away food as yet, except under exceptional 
circumstances, as free distribution of food would tend to deprive the people of all 
energy and self-reliance1'. (97) There was an increase of people leaving Zululand to 
seek work. Government revenue from the issue of passes increased by $677 in 1896 (98), 
and it must be remembered that this represents only the official view of labour l 
migration. Many men left Zululand without passes. 
l 
l The rinderpest outbreak came in the last months of British administration in I 
I Nqutu. m t ,  again, the pattern of response was the same. In April 1896, when the I 
disease was spreading rapidly south from Rhodesia and Bechuanaland (99), the governor 
l issued a proclamation giving resident magistrates wide powers to define areas of I 
I quarantine and prohibit the movement of livestock. (100) In August 1896 there was an 
l increase in the Zululand police force patrolling the border of the Nqutu and Ndwandwe I 
I districts with the South African Republic, to prevent cattle crossing or the importation I  
of hides, bones or horns, andllNative border guardsu were appointed. (101) This force 
was empowered to search people crossing the border. (102) In September 1897, when the , 
disease had spread into Nqutu anyway, the border force was reduced, but many rsf the 
men were taken to guard infected localities. (103) The government undertook a large 
inoculation programme, for which it employed white supervisors and black assistants. (104) 
It relied on the chiefs' example in having their herds inoculated (105), as many of the 
people considered it was inoculation that caused the disease. (106) Through the 
epidemic the powers of government officers grew, and the people's suspicions of them 
increased. While it may be argued that the increased activity of government officers 
was necessary to combat a virulent disease, their laudable efforts to stamp it out 
must be taken together with the fear that existed in the Colonial Office and in 
Pietemaritzburg that the epidemic would lead to an outbreak of violence amongst the 
people of Zululand. H. W. Just in the Colonial Office minuted the despatch on the 
outbreak of rinderpest in Nqutu: "This is most unfortunate and it is impossible to 
foresee what the result may be. Hitherto the natives have not given trouble.I1 (107) 
Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson remarked: "Zulus who have lost cattle feel their losses 
deeply, but according to latest reports there is no sign of unrest or disturbance 
amongst them.I1 (108) The increased presence of government agents must have quietened 
this fear at the same time as it was used to combat disease. 
Charges were made for the inoculation of beasts. Whites were charged 2/6 
for the inoculation of each beast. Blacks were charged one beast out of every herd 
of 50 inoculated. (109) At this time of crisis fox pastoralists a charge levied on 
the herd was a greater attack on their livelihood than any cash payments. The smaller 
the herds the greater the incentive to participate in the cash economy to restock 
them. (110) 
In three years four major crises overtook the people of the Nqutu district. 
The powers of the British government and their nominees grew, as did the pressures to 
enter the labour market and earn money. In 1895 there was a decrease in government 
expenditure on public works. (111) In l896 government expenditure on all public 
works was stopped in order to use the money for famine relief. Only maintenance work 
was carried out. (112) By 1897 all work had stopped on the Nondweni goldfields, which 
had proved unprofitable to work. (113) At the time the need to sell labour increased 
the opportunities to do so in Zululand decreased. The Zululand government overcame 
its reservations about men working on the mines and not returning to their homes with 
the revenue. In l896 a labour agency was opened in Johannesburg to remit wages to 
zululand. (114) 
The natural disasters went a long way to achieving the long-term objects of 
the men who had pressed for British power in Zululmd. Sir Garnet Wolseley had written 
into the agreement he made in 1879 with the 13 appointed chieftains that they would 
l'... allow and encourage all men within their territory to go and come freely for 
peaceful purposes and to work in Natal or the Transvaal or elsewhere for themselves or 
for hiret1. (115) In December 1897 H. W. Just minuted a despatch: ltImpossible now 
hope to preserve the natives in their sylvan simplicity. Rinderpest has robbed them 
of their wealth and if they want to marry and become well to do they must go and 
labour on the goldfields." (116) After the ravages of rinderpest it was no longer 
possible for colonial administrators to make remarks about contentment as they had 
after the more limited disasters of 1896. Then Marshall Clarke was of the opinion 
that the Zulus wnderstood that the government had their welfare at heart. (117) No 
such view was tenable in 1897. Natal annexed a territory where colonial government, 
whose control had once been tenuous, was now firmly entrenched and able to maintain 
itself in power, and where the conditions for the continuation of capitalist relations 
of production were assured. The natives might no longer be contented, but that was 
the price of seeming quiet. 
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